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FAMOUS ECONOMISTS... SPECIAL STANDARDS?
A CRITICAL NOTE ON ADAM SMITH SCHOLARSHIP
Matters are not very much improved when we come to
the historian who qualifies all this [oversimplifi-
cation of Luther] by some such phrase as that "Luther
however was of an essentially medieval cast of mind";
for this parenthetical homage to research is pre-
cisely the vice and the delusion of the whig historian
Herbert Butterfield, The Whig Interpretation
of History
I. The originality of Adam Smith, oftentimes considered to be the
first real economist, is a question of interest not only to economists,
but also, in view of Adam Smith's importance in the history of ideas,
to intellectual historians in general. While Smith has been considered
a pioneer sociologist in the past, in recent times he has also acquired
importance to historians of science such as Gideon Freudenthal and
Otto Mayr. While the substantive issues involved in assessing Adam
Smith's merits as an economist are too complex to be considered within
an essay, it is curious to note how economists, traditionally the most
cynical of intellectuals, have treated this issue. In his classic
article on "The Laws of Returns Under Competitive Conditions," Piero
Sraffa characterized the existing state of discomfort regarding the
supply curve in language that is very much applicable to the current
situation about Adam Smith's originality.
In the tranquil view which the modern [assessment of Adam
Smith] presents us there is one dark spot which disturbs the
harmony of the whole. This is represented by [Adam Smith's
originality] . That its foundations are less solid than those
of the other portions of the structure is generally recog-
nised. That they are actually so weak as to be unable to
support the weight imposed upon them is a doubt which slum-
bers beneath the consciousness of many, but which most suc-
ceed in silently suppressing. From time to time someone is
-2-
unable any longer to resist the pressure of his doubts and
expresses them openly; then, or order to prevent the scandal
spreading, he is promptly silenced, frequently with some con-
cessions and partial admission of his objections, which,
naturally, the theory had implicitly taken into account. And
so, with the lapse of time, the qualifications, the restric-
tions and the exceptions have piled up, and have eaten up, if
not all, certainly the greater part of the theory. If their
aggregate effect is not at once apparent, this is because
they are scattered about in footnotes and articles and care-
fully segregated from one another.
Even though many distinguished economists criticized Adam Smith in
the first half of the nineteenth century—Lord Lauderdale found the
definitions of wealth inconsistent, Dugald Stewart (and Francis Horner)
decided that the measure of value was untenable, Charles Ganilh found
Smith's strictures on the mercantilist desire to increase money to
clash with principles Smith admitted elsewhere, Thomas Robert Malthus
thought free trade beneficial only between countries which exchanged
complementary products, and John Rae doubted the entire schema of
capital accumulation set up in the Wealth of Nations—most of this
criticism was based on the validity of certain doctrines and did not
2
pertain primarily to Smith's originality. It is true that the obit-
uarist of Sir James Steuart had referred to certain plagiarists and
that Dugald Stewart found Smith to be a watered-down version of the
Physiocrats. But Steuart' s interventionist philosophy found few
adherents and the French Revolution dampened public support for the
3Physiocrats. Of the classical economists, J. R. McCulloch was the
only one with a deep knowledge of the primary literature of the seven-
teenth and eighteenth centuries but even he continued to characterize
the earlier literature essentially along the lines laid down in Book
IV of the Wealth of Nations, even while conceding that, prior to
-3-
4
Smith, the nature of commerce of exchanges, of the division of labor,
and of money and banking had all been "fully ascertained."
In 1804, J. B. Say had claimed that "Whenever the Wealth of Nations
is perused with the attention it so well merits, it will be perceived
that until the epoch of its publication, the science of political eco-
nomy did not exist." Even though it is a rare scholar who would make
such an unguarded statement today, it is nonetheless true that, at least
by implication, such an opinion is still fairly widespread today. A
recent book on capitalism speaks of Adam Smith as "almost the first
economist"; E. G. West writes that "Down to Adam Smith's time in the
eighteenth century the occupation of commerce and trade were suspect.
The activities of buying and selling and lending money were inhibited
by the vague feeling that they were sinful"; W. E. Cullison speaks of
interdependent preferences as having influenced many economists "ever
since it was articulated by Adam Smith"; Huston McCulloch writes that
"Before the Austrians came on the scene, economists were troubled by
the so-called paradox of value, as Adam Smith expressed it."
Both Vaizey and West are perpetuating historical fictions, while
the bias of Cullison and McCulloch are subtler and more deep-routed; it
is implicitly assumed in their sentences that Smith was the first econo-
mist to speak of interdependent preferences or the paradox of value.
In point of fact, the precise concept, conspicuous consumption, that
Veblen is credited with, may be found in Locke, while readers familiar
with Schumpeter know that the paradox of value had been stated and
solved several times before Smith.
-4-
Systeraatic attempts to place Smith in proper historical context
began only in the 1880' s with the revival of Mercantilism as the eco-
nomic side of nation building. From approximately 1880 down to 1950
considerable work was done on the economic ideas of the seventeenth
and eighteenth centuries. By 1893 Edwin Cannan could claim that "no
one any longer believes that political economy was invented by Adam
Smith and perfected by John Stuart Mill." Nonetheless, some 80 years
later we find just such claims of originality put forward on behalf of
Adam Smith. Why has scholarship had so little effect?
Without meaning to deny the attempts of some quarters to ignore
uncomfortable facts, I would like to focus on a deeper fault in Smithian
scholarship—a pervasive refusal to apply to Smith the same criteria
that are applied to other economists. In the sections that follow, I
have tried to document this claim by paying particular attention to
several of the most eminent Smith scholars, such as Edwin Cannan, A. W.
Coats, H. C. Recktenwald, Paul Samuelson, and Jacob Viner. Whether or
not Smith actually borrowed from others is besides the point. What is
important is that scholars make an effort to see Smith in context.
This is not possible unless the same standards are applied to Smith as
to everyone else. The evidence suggests that this has not been done.
As a result, Smithian scholarship presents an odd intermixture between
historical research and hagiography.
-5-
II. Edwin Caiman's editorial work on the Wealth of Nations is a
marvel of scholarship and served to indicate to all future scholars
what could be done. In particular, Cannan not only traced Adam
Smith's own references but also, with partial knowledge of Adam
Smith's personal library as well as the libraries Smith had access to,
Cannan tried to ascertain even those sources Smith did not directly
8
refer to.
Of course a careful comparison of words and phrases often
makes it certain that a particular statement must have come
from a particular source. Nevertheless many of the refer-
ences given must be regarded as indicating merely a possible
source of information or inspiration. I have refrained from
quoting or referring to parallel passages in other authors
when it is impossible or improbable that Smith ever saw them.
That many more references might be given by an editor gifted
with omniscience I know better than any one. To discover a
reference has often taken hours of labour: to fail to
discover one has often taken days.
In his Editor's Introduction Cannan goes considerably beyond the
"merely probable" in assigning Adam Smith's sources. He notes that
the Wealth of Nations contains various doctrines not found in Smith's
9
earlier Lectures .
The introduction of the theory of stock or capital and unpro-
ductive labour in Book II. , the slipping of a theory of dis-
tribution into the theory of prices towards the end of Book
I. , chapter vi. , and the emphasising of the conception of
annual produce. These changes do not make so much real dif-
ference to Smith's own work as might be supposed; But to
subsequent economics they were of fundamental importance.
They settled the form of economic treatises for a century at
least.
Cannan unhesitatingly ascribes these changes to the influence of the
Physiocrats.
They were of course due to the acquaintance with the French
Economistes which Adam Smith made during his visit to France
with the Duke of Buccleugh in 1764-6.
-6-
Next , Cannan considers the influence of Smith's teacher, Francis
Hutcheson, at some length, particularly on value, coin, taxation and
habits of industry. Cannan then concludes
Dr. Scott draws attention to the curious fact that the very
order in which the subjects happen to occur in Hutcheson'
s
System is almost identical with the order in which the same
subjects occur in Smith's Lectures. We are strongly tempted
to surmise that when Smith had hurriedly to prepare his lec-
tures for Craigie's class, he looked through his notes of his
old master's lectures (as hundreds of men in his position
have done before and after him) and grouped the economic sub-
jects together as an introduction and sequel to the lectures
which he had brought with him from Edinburgh.
Next, Cannan attributes Smith's belief in self-love to the influence
of Mandeville.
If we bear in mind Smith's criticism of Hutcheson and Mandeville
in adjoining chapters of the Moral Sentiments , and remember
further that he must almost certainly have become acquainted
with the Fable of the Bees when attending Hutcheson 's lec-
tures or soon afterwards, we can scarcely fail to suspect
that it was Mandeville who first made him realize that "it is
not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer or the
baker that we expect our dinner, but from their regard to
their own interest." Treating the word "vice" as a mistake
for self-love, Adam Smith could have repeated with cordiality
Mandeville 's lines.
After a further brief excursion into the possible influence of Hume,
13Cannan appears to be embarrassed by his own scholarship.
It would be useless to carry the inquiry into the origin of
Adam Smith's views any further here. Perhaps it has been
carried too far already. In the course of the Wealth of
Nations Smith actually quotes by their own name or that of
their authors almost one hundred books. An attentive study
of the notes to the present edition will convince the reader
that though a few of these are quoted at second hand the
number actually used was far greater. Usually but little,
sometimes only a single fact, phrase or opinion, is taken
from each, so that few authors are less open than Adam Smith
to the reproach of having rifled another man's work.
Is it not curious how, after carefully telling us that Smith derived
his notions of capital, unproductive labor, national income, value,
-7-
coin, taxation and the beneficence of self-interest from others,
Cannan suddenly claims that "few authors are less open than Adam Smith
to the charge of having rifled another man's work." Cannan tells us
that the charge has been seriously offered only with respect to
Turgot, a charge which he dismisses as unproven. But surely Cannan
himself has discovered a great deal of debt. As for having borrowed
"only a single, fact or opinion," it is Cannan who carefully showed
how Smith adopted the advantages of the division of labor entirely
from the French Encyclopedie and who suggests in his footnotes that
the benefits of high wages occurred to Smith through reading
14Berkeley's Querist . It is possible to describe the division of
labor and the desirability of high wages as single ideas, but they are
surely important ones. Why does Cannan stop himself from drawing the
natural conclusions from his extensive research?
How seriously Cannan himself took the attributions of Smith's
ideas to the predecessors indicated in the footnotes was made evident
some 30 years later when he came to write a sesquicentennial article
on Adam Smith. Evidently, Smith's economic analysis holds little
charm for Cannan.
Very little of Adam Smith's scheme of economics has been left
standing by subsequent inquirers. No one now holds his
theory of value, his account of capital is seen to be hope-
lessly confused, and his theory of distribution is explained
as an illassorted union between his own theory of prices and
the physiocrats' fanciful Economic Table. His classification
of incomes is found to involve a misguided attempt to alter
the ordinary useful and well-recognised meaning of words, and
a mixing up of classification according to source with clas-
sification according to method or manner of receipt. His
opinions about taxation and its incidence are extremely
crude, and his history is based on insufficient information
and disfigured by bias.
-8-
However, Cannan does consider Smith to have made three great contribu-
tions. The third of these concerns Smith's glorification of bourgeois
economic virtues and does not really concern us. The first and second
reasons however are
First ... the definite subsititution of income... for the
older idea of a capital aggregation of "treasure" or
something akin to "treasure"... The second great change
which Adam Smith made in general theory was to substitute
wealth per head for wealth in the aggregate ... (pp. 20, 22).
It so happens that Berkeley had argued at length for the deraystif ica-
tion of money while Cannan himself had earlier credited Berkeley with
the emphasis upon per capita values! Berkeley was a philosopher of
great repute, widely read in Scotland, whose Querist appeared in 10
editions between 1737 and 1757 and was reprinted in Glasgow itself.
Adam Smith owned a copy. On what grounds can Cannan deny his earlier
scholarship?
One possible argument is hinted at by Cannan himself. "The Wealth
of Nations was not written hastily with the impressions of recent
reading still vivid on the author's brain. Its composition was spread
18
over at least the twenty-seven years from 1749 to 1776." When this
lengthy period of composition is combined with Adam Smith's absent-
mindedness, it is supposed to make up an argument showing the inappro-
priateness of focusing upon Adam Smith's possible indebtedness. It so
happens that Smith's memory was not poor for all sources. He had an
excellent memory for classical authors and was known to quote them
extensively from memory. As to having writen the Wealth of Nations
over at least 10 years, this seems to be a very good reason for
getting one's sources right.
-9-
Thirty years later, F. T. H. Fletcher praises Montesquieu for dis-
19 ..
cussing economic questions in a truly scientific and objective
manner, without philosophical preconceptions ...exactly in the spirit
of Adam Smith." A little later, Fletcher is drawn to comparing parts
of the Wealth of Nations with corresponding parts of the Espirit des
Lois . However, he wishes to make it clear that nothing he might have
20
to say should be construed as an attack on Adam Smith.
It is certain that Adam Smith had a most remarkable power,
...of assimilating and making organically his own the wisdom
that he culled from other writers. While, therefore, an
attempt will be made to relate certain things in the Wealth
of Nations to passages and ideas in the Esprit des Lois , it
is very far from the present writer's intention to make out a
charge of plagiarism against Adam Smith. One feels indeed
that even if such a case could be made out, it would be quite
irrelevant.
It is not entirely clear why the charge of plagiarism is irrelevant,
but Fletcher goes on to claim something very like it in the next few
25pages.
It will now be shown that even in some of the details of his
doctrine upon taxation, Smith closely, and sometimes verbally,
follows Montesquieu. This is particularly the case with
regard to indirect taxes, capitation and methods of collec-
tion. It is doubtless not remarkable that Montesquieu and
Smith should agree in preferring indirect to direct taxation,
but it seems fairly clear that in some of his most vital
passages Smith, under a faint disguise, definitely copied
Montesquieu . [emphasis added]
This is followed by three parallel quotes from Smith and Montesquieu
which indicate definite copying by the former. Thereafter we have
three more passages where Smith followed Montesquieu's arguments
"faithfully" and a variety of other instances where Smith either
borrowed or else misunderstood and misinterpreted Montesquieu.
Fletcher even makes the large claim that "It would be an easy matter
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to go on to demonstrate by means of other parallel passages that Smith
frequently consulted the Esplrlt des Lois for his historical data con-
cerning ancient Greek, Roman and Egyptian trade." Apparently none of
this copying and borrowing constitutes plagiarism. Then why does
Fletcher adopt a totally different approach when considering the rela-
22
tionship of Blackstone to Montesquieu?
The only strictly economic question that interested Blackstone
was revenue. But here it is a touching sight to see with
what simple, childlike faith he clings to the percepts of his
master Montesquieu. Taxes, he conceives, are—what Montesquieu
says they are. Custom duties are good, because—Montesquieu
likes them. But if they are excessive they place a restraint
upon trade, encourage smuggling, and hence give rise to dis-
proportionate penalties; this must be true, because Montesquieu
says it is.
Sufficient evidence has been adduced to show that Blacks tone's
only contribution to the science of political economy was to
disseminate in England ideas that he had taken bodily out of
the Esprit des Lois .
-11-
III. Closely linked with the tendency to ignore Smith's prede-
cessors and to inquire into the exact nature of Smith's contribution
is a prediliction for giving Smith the benefit of doubt to such an
extent as to make the standards for judging Smith different from those
for judging other economists. This fault is clearly visible in a
paper of Paul Samuelson. In Samuelson's theoretical reinterpreta-
tion of the Wealth of Nations we find that the only economists, other
than Smith, who are referred to are Malthus, Ricardo and Marx, despite
the assertion in the first paragraph that Smith has risen in
23
Samuelson's estimation, "both absolutely and in comparison with his
predecessors and successors." It is the explicit claim of having
studied the prior literature before coming to a judgment that is the
most worrisome feature of Samuelson's assertion. Such claims almost
inevitably generate the impression that Smith was "the first serious
economist." Consider the following sentence.
"Smith even before Malthus and Marx believed that human labor
itself had a reproduction cost at... subsistence."
The dependence of population on subsistence is not only a well-worn
theme in the pre-Smithian literature but the Malthusian thesis itself
is to be found fully and eloquently described by both Robert Wallace
and Sir James Steuart. By the standards of his predecessors, Smith's
treatment of population is poor. In the same vein, since at least one
economist, R. L. Meek, has seen Smith's genius to lie in the introduc-
tion of profits into the composition of price, thereby decomposing
price into wages, profits, and rents, a decomposition that Samuelson
defends, it should at least deserve mention that this decomposition
-12-
was suggested by James Oswald, the "mercantilist" lawyer-laird who was
25
a friend of both Smith and Hume."
Finally, those who have not read the Wealth of Nations can scarcely
appreciate how bewildering that book is when one wants to extract
rigorous analysis from it. An early partisan, Francis Horner, came to
the conclusion that the confusion lay not in the writing but in
Smith's mind itself.
Many years ago, when I first read the Wealth of Nations
, the
whole of the first book appeared to me as perspicuous as it
was interesting and new. Some time afterwards, while I lived
in England, I attempted to make an abstract of Smith's prin-
cipal reasonings; but I was impeded by the doctrine of the
real measure of value, and the distinction between nominal
and real price: the discovery that I did not understand
Smith, speedily led me to doubt whether Smith understood
himself.
Jacob Viner had once remarked that one would have to be an economist
with truly unusual views not to find a supporting quote somewhere in
the Wealth of Nations . Hence, when Samuelson claims that he extracts
a consistent general equilibrium and growth model from the Wealth of
Nations with "a little midwifery sleight of hand," I would suggest
that there is nothing slight in extracting the system that Samuelson
does extract: Such a system could be visible only to those who have
otherwise reached a consistent understanding of the economic mechan-
ism. The same generosity, if extended to, say, John Locke, would
equally produce a fully developed general equilibrium model (in fact,
one closely akin to that of the Physiocrats). A double standard has
been employed in judging Smith vis-a-vis his predecessors. Not only
has Samuelson' s presentation gone unchallenged, it has even been
-13-
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accepted by scholars of note. This is a sad reflection of the rela-
tive professional status of economic theorists versus historians of
economic thought.
The general trend of the recent literature has been to emphasize
either the difficulty or the futility of establishing Smith's rela-
tionship to his predecessors and contemporaries. Thus, Andrew Skinner
28
and Robert Campbell write that:
It is obviously difficult to the point of impossibility to
establish the extent of Smith's debts to his predecessors...
it need not surpirse us to discover that the W[ealth] [of]
N[ations] may also represent a great synthetic performance,
R. H. Coase is somewhat more patronizing of historians in his treament
29
of the question of priorities:
Historians of economic thought tell us, I am sure correctly,
of the works of others, such as Hutcheson and Mandeville,
that influenced Smith. But he absorbed their ideas and made
them serve purposes of his own.
In a survey article published in the widely read Journal of
Economic Literature
, Horst Claus Recktenwald raises some of the
questions arising from the viewpoint urged in this essay and dismisses
30them as nitpicking.
Occasionally when quoting from memory, Smith misattributed
ideas, or his use of authorities may be inaccurate. At times
he neglects to quote the source, even unconsciously repeating
phrases from his own or other writings. Viewed pedantically
and perhaps unfairly compared with later criteria of trans-
cription, such carelessness can be made to appear as a sub-
stantial fault or even plagiarism, a charge sometimes raised
in literature. But compared to Smith's mental power, his
grandiose concept, and his own Intellectual indebtedness,
this charge seems to me to be merely "beckmesserisch"
(nitpicking).
If Smith repeats phrases from his own writings that is scarcely an
issue but how would Recktenwald know that Smith "unconsciously"
-14-
repeats other writings? And if Smith only misattributed ideas, this
would be a relatively minor point—the real point is that Smith mis-
stated peoples' ideas, such as those of Locke or the Physiocrats.
Recktenwald provides a good example of how Smithian scholarship claims
to have done its homework, while failing to do so. Such carelessness
is scarcely fair, for a good deal of Smith's fame in popular minds is
based on historical misunderstandings of the sort dismissed by
Recktenwald.
William Letwin's The Origins of Scientifc Economics , is a mar-
velous study of the difficulties economics faced in achieving indepen-
dent status. The careful textual and contexual study of such pioneers
as Josiah Child and William Petty have made it an influential book.
Letwin believes that economics is properly considered an axiomatic
science and develops this point of view by a critical evaluation of
the major economists of the post-Restoration era. One may not agree
with such a view of economics but there can be no denying the crafts-
manship with which the study is conducted. Unfortunately, the last
chapter is made to serve as a pedestal for Smithian hagiography. All
the judicious criticism and methodological care of earlier chapters
are tossed away in order to sing a paean for Letwin's hero. Josiah
Child's failure to give due credit to his sources is developed with
painstaking care in the chapter on Child and repeated in the final
31introduction to Smith.
The spirit of combat could, however, generate a somewhat more
productive appeal to tradition, when a writer tried to arm
himself with the authority of the past, a technique of which
Child was especially fond. Although he drew his explanation
of Holland's commercial excellence from the works of Henry
-15-
Robinson, Benjamin Worsley and Samuel Lambe, and did so
without acknowledging his dependence, he sought to support
his chief proposal, to lower interest rates by law, with
heavy authority.
Nonetheless, when it is a question of Smith's borrowings, Letwin
decides this is not an issue worth the same loving care given to
32
Child.
Vast efforts, induced by natural piety, have been invested by
generations of scholars in tracing back all of Smith's ideas
to some intellectual ancestor or other; it need hardly be
said that for each of his main ideas and for many details
scholars have been able to locate substantial pedigrees.
But it hardly needs an editor to point out to us how much
Smith owed to other authors: he himself quoted authorities,
quoted them by the dozens. These acknowledgments, coupled
with the reconstructed catalogue of his library, show how
widely he had read in the economic literature, how firmly he
stood on the shoulders of his predecessors.
Letwin leads the reader astray by not informing him that most of
Smith's references do not bear on substantative doctrinal points. Why
do we not need to know further about the details of Smith's borrow-
ings? Because, Letwin believes, Smith provided the completion of
earlier doctrines, much as we need not inquire into Newton's prede-
33
cessors if we are interested in the laws of motion.
All the efforts of seventeenth and eighteenth century eco-
nomic writers culminated in the Wealth of Nations . Every-
thing useful that they did, Adam Smith incorporated; every-
thing worth doing that they left undone, he accomplished.
He added to what he had inherited, but much of what he added
was by way of tying together loose ends, bringing into
sensible relation principles and intuitions that had been
left standing isolated.
To support this thesis, Letwin develops carefully the doctrine of Free
Trade as argued by Adam Smith in Book IV, Chapter 3, of the Wealth of
Nations . This chapter is probably the only one in the entire Wealth
-16-
of Nations deserving of Le twin's panegyric. Does he really believe
that a book of 1,000 pages can be defended by the doctrines contained
in 20? What about all the confusion sowed by Smith on the measure of
value or degrees of productivity of capital, as well as the biased and
misleading presentation of the Mercantile and Physiocratic systems?
Letwin insists that Schumpeter was wrong in denigrating systematic
work.
Schumpeter did not fail to praise Smith, but it is praise for
the great performance of work that, whatever its merits, has
made no contribution to pure economic theory.
This criticism misses the relations between system and
science. Not every systematizing effort is a scientific one:
it may result in nothing more than a telephone directory or a
chronicle if the ordering principle is trivial and obvious.
But to master unwieldy material and subject it to the rule of
a small number of coherent principles, as Schumpeter rightly
said Smith did, is to put the material into a system, and if
that material is itself theoretical, then it is to create a
work superior in scientific merit to any of its component
bits.
What Schumpeter confused, and it is a confusion as common in
the history of science as it is dangerous in the practice of
science, is the scientific character of a work with its
truth. Newton's Princlpia is not absolutely correct, but it
is perfectly scientific. The Wealth of Nations is far from
perfectly correct, but it too is perfectly scientific.
If it Is a system that is wanted, why was the organization of eco-
nomics around the balance of trade not a scientific work? Science is
supposed to start with simple systems and no one has denied that
focusing on the balance of trade introduced both method and clarity.
Since Letwin correctly notes that a scientific work need not be
entirely true, why does he not judge the theory of the Balance of
Trade with the same criteria that he uses for the Wealth of Nations?
-17-
IV. This paper began by noting a pervasive "yes-but" quality to
Sraithian scholarship. It would not do to buttress such an accusation
by picking obscure commentators of Adam Smith. Let me therefore use a
highly respected essay of Jacob Viner to illustrate how scholars have
made concessions with one hand only to take them back with both. Viner
begins by telling us that:
There is much weight of authority and of evidence. . .that
Smith's major claim to originality. . .was his detailed and
elaborate application to the wilderness of economic phenomena
of the unifying concept of a coordinated and mutually inter-
dependent system of cause and effect relationships which
philosophers and theologians had already applied to the world
in general.
This is a strong beginning. Certainly if Smith managed to coordinate
"the wilderness of economic phenomenon" he did a marvelous thing. Our
37
expectations are heightened by Viner' s subsequent claim that:
Smith was the great eclectic. He drew upon all previous
knowledge. . .Science, philosophy, theology, psychology,
history, contemporary observation of facts—all of them were
made to produce under Smith's capable management, an abun-
dance of evidence of the existence of an order in nature in
which beneficient intentions toward mankind could be dis-
cerned.
However, one is led to wonder about the true capability of Smith's
38
management when this praise is followed by the judgment that:
If Smith at times showed more catholicity than scientific
discrimination in what he accepted as supporting evidence, if
some of this evidence appeared upon close scrutiny to be
conjectural, contradictory, irrelevant or inconclusive, the
richness of argument, the power of his exposition, the
attractiveness of his conclusions served to overwhelm the
captious critic and to postpone closer scrutiny to a later
day.
The reader is left to figure out just how rich and powerful an argument
must be that can survive "conjectural, contradictory, irrelevant or in-
conclusive" evidence.
-18-
A little later we find that Smith's eclecticism leads to another
39happy property:
Traces of every conceivable sort of doctrine are to be found
in that most catholic book [ The Wealth of Nations ] , and an
economist must have peculiar theories indeed who cannot quote
from the Wealth of Nations to support his special purposes.
If then Smith produced a synthesis it must have been by gathering
together under the same covers all existing ideas, rather than by
culling out the best of the existing melee of ideas and supporting his
particular choice. Let us look at how this method is exemplified in
Smith's treatment of the functions of government. Smith, Viner tells
40
us,
Nowhere gathered together in orderly fashion the exceptions
which he would have made to his general restriction of
government activity to protection, justice and the mainten-
ance of a few types of public works and public institutions.
When considering in general terms the proper functions of
government, he forgot all about these exceptions . [emphasis
added.]
41And a little later,
In stray but frequent moments of intimate contact with facts
apparently hostile to the principle of natural liberty, Smith
conveniently forgot the principle and went beyond the limits
set in his formal discussion of the proper activities of
government.
In other words, one is hard-pressed to get any clear guidance from
Smith on this vital issue. Depending on whether one uses Adam Smith's
stated principles or his examples one can support both sides in a dis-
pute. So well does Viner write that the reader of Viner' s entire essay
will come away with a view of Smith as a rich and profound thinker.
All Smith's faults have been noted by Viner, but in such oblique fashion
that Smith's inconsistent and ad hoc treatment of government activity
—
-19-
attributed at one point to his "moderation," at another to his "absent-
mindedness"—actually appears as a virtue.
One cannot grudge Viner his mastery of English, but it is notice-
able that at two crucial points Viner claims that Smith followed facts
rather than theories, but fails to provide supporting evidence,
Smith's argument for the existence of a natural harmony in
the economic order... is, in form at least, built up by
detailed inference from specific data, and by examination of
specific problems, and is not deduced from wide-sweeping
generalizations concerning the universe in general.
It is to his [Smith's] credit that when there was sharp con-
flict between his generalization and his data he usually
abandoned his generalization.
By contrast, the most recent editors of the Wealth of Nations
,
R. H.
Campbell and A. S. Skinner, after a careful review of Smith's attitude
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to some important facts, come to the conclusion that,
In his discussion of both the laws of apprenticeship and
settlement Smith provides evidence which damages his own
case... The general principles, the opposition to restric-
tions... were held so strongly that there seemed no case to
answer.
In other words, Smith's attitude to facts is precisely one of his
weak points.
The failure to see Smith in context is not limited to economic
theorists alone. Even social historians are sometimes prone to it. A
paper of A. W. Coats is important because, in his early work, Coats
has provided admirable socio-historical treatments of the history of
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economics. An essay by Coats on a historical topic can be expected
to be influential. The title of Coat's piece is "Adam Smith and the
Mercantile System" and this holds considerable promise. Coats begins
by stating that though Smith's treatment of Mercantilism was "an
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emphatic piece of free-trade propaganda," he suggests that "it is also
much more than this." Let us briefly look at the paper, section by
section, to see how such a claim is sustained.
Section II asks how Smith could object to Mercantilism when the sys-
tem arose naturally (inevitably?) out of the highest stage of society
—
commercial society? No evidence is produced (to my knowledge there is
none) to suggest that Smith believed that merchants must dominate the
government of commercial society and the problem would appear to be one
of Coat's own creation. The question having been posed, however, Coats
finds the answer to lie in Smith's view that theories of political econ-
omy could have considerable influence on legislators. The section con-
cludes by noting Smith's inconsistencies, reminding us that these may
have arisen out of his conjectural view of history, but asking us to
nevertheless take Smith's use of particular facts seriously. Section
III discusses problems posed by the fact that "It is by no means clear
from Smith's account which section of the propertied classes would 'na-
turally' have the upper hand in a commercial society." This is true,
and if this fact had been noticed earlier it would have been
superfluous to write Section II.
Section IV reminds us that the British Colonial System was not as
harmful in practice as theory might lead us to believe and that it was
less harmful in the case of the British than of other European
nations. Coats does not add that this was very much staple fare with
the pre-Smithians. In conclusion, we are told that, "This abbreviated
survey of Smith's account of the mercantile system reveals his ability
to combine economic principles with historical examples," and that
-21-
modern historians admit that there was some justice in Adam Smith's
strictures. In sum, Coats tells us that, "Thus even in the most pole-
mical parts of his writings Smith's sense of historical reality did
not desert him."
Harsh as it may sound, I would claim that Coats has set up a
strawman; no serious scholar has suggested that Smith's treatment of
Mercantilism was totally unbalanced. No doubt a caricature exaggera-
tes, but its entire impact surely lies seizing upon and ridiculing
some true points. How many of us know of propaganda that does not
contain some truth? The only point in reminding us that there are
many useful observations in Book IV of the Wealth of Nations after
having admitted that it is piece of propaganda, is to suggest that the
propaganda aspect has been greatly overplayed. This is made clear in
46the following lines of Coats.
Smith's profound impact on his own and subsequent genera-
tions— [is]—mainly attributable to his exceptional skill in
combining analysis with empirical data, with historical
examples, and with direct and incisive comments on the con-
ditions and tendencies of his own times.
An assessment of this sort improves in the re-telling and it is there-
fore no surprise to find that Recktenwald does take Coats' essay to
indicate a reversal of previous judgments about Smith on
47Mercantilism.
Coats' careful interpretation of 'Adam Smith and the
Mercantile System' is an example of disentangling the
combination of Smith's subtle analysis, historical
insight, and policy prescriptions. These closely
interwoven strands of thought we find also in some
other parts of Smith's works. Coats' article opens
interesting perspectives regarding Smith's theory of
history and politics and Smith's view of economic
development.
-22-
With this conclusion I must strongly disagree. As pointed out in
the summary of Coats' article, no new facts are brought forth in
Coats' "careful interpretation" and the substantive conclusion only
serves to knock down a straw-man. Furthermore, no mention is made
throughout the paper of what Smith's predecessors had to say. It is
misleading to call the advocacy of a complete union between Britain
and Ireland Smith's "most remarkable prognostication" without
informing us that this project was also advocated by several well-
48
known authors from 1700 onwards. Josiah Tucker, for example, was
one of the most determined supporters of Anglo-Irish union. His ideas
were repeatedly used, without acknowledgement, during the Irish Trade
Debates in 1784 and it is said that Tucker's words supporting the
Union were reprinted, at Government expense, during the debates on the
Union in 1800. Or consider the suggestion that Smith's "enthusiasm
for liberty of commerce. . .was reinforced by his knowledge of the
49progress of Glasgow since the Treaty of Union in 1707." As Glasgow
grew under the shelter of the protected colonial trade, does not the
inference appear to be contrary to fact? Instances like these, from
scholars who should know better, testify to the deadening effect
Smith's fame has had upon scholarship.
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V. In 1903, E. R. A. Seligraan had complained of the failure of
scholars to put Smith's ideas in proper historical context:
The absence of an historical school of economics in England
and the glamour of a few great names which have thrown
everything else into the shade explain, but do not excuse
this neglect. Careful students of Adam Smith who are at the
same time acquainted with the earlier literature, are well
aware of how much he owes to his predecessors; but the ordi-
nary manuals of the history of economics lay but little
emphasis on this debt.
These sentiments were largely confirmed by the later studies of Eli
Heckscher, Bruno Suivranta and Jacob Viner in the next quarter century
and the same general thesis reasserted by W. D. Grampp in 1952.
Even after most of this research was published C. R. Fay, one of the
most loving students of Adam Smith, told us of some of Adam Smith's
52immediate predecessors that
The writers of the time... were what they had always been, the
mouthpiece of the merchant... The burden of Gee was self-
sufficiency. I picture him as a timid, dyspeptic little man.
. . .Malachi Postlethwayt was a ponderous edition of Gee...
[In 1759] he was a writer of standing, and incidentally a
purloiner, without acknowledgement, from Cantillon's Essay on
the Nature of Trade. He was a burglar to the manner born.
No doubt, there is a proper way to read such remarks—and I believe
Fay to be distinguished largely by his bluntness—but one would like
to see an even-handed approach to Smith.
It seems hard to believe that scholars of Adam Smith have not
recognized there are broad implications of such work as has been done
on Mercantilism and there are occassional hints on this score. For
example, if one knows what to look for, there is much criticism
implicit in Campbell and Skinner's editorial introduction to the
Wealth of Nations . But this is a very unsatisfactory procedure. The
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profession will not absorb such uncomfortable findings unless some
blunt speech is used. The failure of modern scholars to speak plainly
about Smith and to publicize the results of research on his intel-
53lectual debts has led to widespread ignorance. Whether it be
articles by famous economists or non-economists . .
The very idea that the social institutions were not given by
nature or God, but could be changed to improve the human lot,
may perhaps have distant roots in Plato's Republic, but it
only really begins to penetrate the thinking of politically
active and concerned people after Adam Smith. (Boudling)
The very idea of "development" is something that took a long
time to "develop" in history. In many respects, Adam Smith
was the very first to imagine a political economy based upon
the imperative of development. He saw the immense poverty
and misery of the world, and believed that it was not neces-
sary. He was the first to foresee a world made interdepend-
ent and united in productive pursuits, lawlike, pacific, and
dynamic. With this vision began a great revolution. (Novak)
or texts written by distinguished economists . .
As astronomy has Newton's principle of universal gravitation,
and biology Darwin's principle of evolution through natural
selection, economics also has a great unifying scientific
conception. Its discovery was, like Newton's and Darwin's,
one of the important intellectual achievements of humanity...
Adam Smith's The Weatlh of Nations appeared in 1776.
(Hirshliefer)
Adam Smith, a Scotsman, is acknowledged by almost all econo-
mists (in a remarkable display of agreement) to have estab-
lished economics as a science in 1776, when he published
The Wealth of Nations . This most comprehensive treatise
explained the division of labor; the determination of prices
of goods and incomes of workers, capitalists, and landowners;
and a dozen other parts of economic life. (Stigler)
54
... the same ahistorical Smith is continually presented. It is
scarcely surprising therefore to find echoes of these views in book
reviews and research reports.
Development economics started with Adam Smith's The
Wealth of Nations ...
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Since the first economic book, The Wealth of Nations
by Adam Smith. .
.
A rephrase of Cannan's dissatisfaction with the state of Ricardo
—
Malthus scholarship in the 1890's will make his strictures applicable
today.
In the ordinary critical and constructive books on political
economy there are frequent statements respecting the history
of economic doctrines. But these statements are seldom of
much value to the historian. They are often based on inac-
curate quotations from memory, and the reader is scarcely
ever given the references which would enable him to check
them. So far as they relate to [Adam Smith] they are espe-
cially unsatisfactory and untrustworthy. It has been con-
stantly supposed that [Adam Smith's fame] must be defended at
almost any cost, and the result has been the creation of a
mythical [Adam Smith], who never wrote anything which cannot
be "limited and explained" till it ceases to be in conflict
either with recognised fact or accepted modern opinion.
How long can economists persist in giving themselves a mythical
history? Is our need for heroes and founding fathers so great that we
have to wiggle our standards to preserve our textbooks? Or are we
obliquely praising ourselves by claiming that it took a great genius
to provide us with first principles?
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